Labor Arbitration: Appealing the Procedural Decisions of Arbitrators by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1974
Labor Arbitration: Appealing the Procedural
Decisions of Arbitrators
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Labor Arbitration: Appealing the Procedural Decisions of Arbitrators" (1974). Minnesota Law Review.
3053.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3053
Note: Labor Arbitration: Appealing the Procedural
Decisions of Arbitrators
As long as the agreement to arbitrate and the arbitration
award are voluntarily accepted by the parties concerned, an arbi-
tration provision in a collective bargaining agreement makes re-
sort to the courts unnecessary for the settlement of disputes be-
tween labor and management. However, when one of the par-
ties is dissatisfied with the workings of the arbitration process,
the courts may be called upon to enforce the agreement to arbi-
trate, to enforce the arbitrator's decision, or to hear a challenge
to the award.1 The courts' position on reviewing the merits of
an arbitrator's award is clear-no review will ordinarily be at-
tempted.2 However, the standards for reviewing procedural deci-
sions made iby an arbitrator are far from clear, even though the
numerous decisions of this type made during the course of any
arbitration proceeding may be crucial to its outcome.3  Speedy
judicial review of an arbitrator's procedural decisions is therefore
important to all parties to the arbitration process. This Note
will discuss both the standards for review of such procedural
decisions and the methods of obtaining such review.
I. SOURCE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
GOVERNING APPEALS
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 provides:
1. P. HAYS, LABOR AmITR&TION: A DISSENNG VIEw 20-21 (1966)[hereinafter cited as HAYS].
2. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
3. The importance of an arbitrator's procedural decisions can be
easily illustrated. For example, assume that just before an arbitration
hearing is to begin the employer learns that his principal witness, a per-
son who is not an employee, is out of town and will not be available
for several weeks. When the arbitrator refuses to postpone the hearing,
the employer is unable to present any evidence on his behalf. Obviously,
the decision of the arbitrator to hold the hearing when an important wit-
ness is unavailable will have a substantial, and perhaps decisive, effect
on the outcome of the arbitration. Other procedural decisions of an ar-
bitrator, while not affecting the outcome of the arbitration proceeding,
may cause one of the parties to suffer considerable hardship. For exam-
ple, the failure of an arbitrator to reach a decision in a reasonable time
after the hearing may have a devastating effect on an employee who is
relying on the arbitration process to regain his job, but will not receive
back pay even if he prevails in the arbitration.
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Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.4
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,5 the Supreme Court
held that section 301 (a) did more than merely give federal courts
jurisdiction over suits for violation of collective bargaining agree-
ments; it also authorized them to fashion a body of substantive
federal law to govern such suits.6 Since this substantive law
must reflect national labor policy, the Court reasoned that it
should be federal in origin, pointing out that "[i] t is not uncom-
mon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights
are concerned . . . .Congress has indicated by Section 301(a)
the purpose to follow that course here.'" 7
This rationale for a federal common law was reiterated five
years later in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 8 That case
4. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Since section 301 is applicable to all
contracts "between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce," it is proper to consider
the section as covering practically all collective bargaining agreements.
See Cone Bros. Contracting Co. v. Bricklayers Local 3, 263 F.2d 297 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 904 (1959).
5. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6. However, the applicability of section 301(a) is limited to dis-
putes between parties covered by the National Labor Relations Act. That
Act specifically excludes from coverage
the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation,
or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof . .. or any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organization(other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization....[or] any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in
the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an em-
ployer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time
to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (1970).
7. 353 U.S. at 457. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion,
responded that
the most that can be said in support of finding a congressional
desire to impose these "legislative" duties on the federal courts
is that Congress did not mention the problem in the statute and
that, insofar as purpose may be gathered from congressional re-
ports and debates, they leave us in the dark.
353 U.S. at 465.
8. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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involved an action in a state court to recover business losses
caused when a union went on strike, allegedly in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. The state court had applied
state law and held that a no-strike clause should be read by im-
plication into a collective bargaining agreement that contained a
provision requiring disputes to be settled by arbitration. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's substantive
holding but did not agree that state law should apply. Writing
for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that even though an ac-
tion to enforce a collective bargaining agreement could be
brought in a state court,9 federal law must be applied. The
Court stated:
[T]he importance of the area which would be affected by sep-
arate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single
body of federal law particularly compelling. The ordering and
adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and
voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal
scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates
the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that
process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy.
With due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing
state and federal interests in this area.., we cannot but con-
clude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of fed-
eral labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local
rules.' 0
It is therefore well established that suits to enforce collective
bargaining agreements-and therefore actions to review awards
resulting from the arbitration clauses commonly found in such
agreements-are governed by a federal substantive law to be de-
veloped by the lower federal courts. In both the Lincoln Mills
and Luca Flour cases, however, the Supreme Court stopped short
of specifying the source of that federal substantive law. When
dealing with arbitration agreements specifically, there are sev-
9. In Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the Court held
that section 301(a) does not divest state courts of jurisdiction in a suit
for violation of a provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Con-
current jurisdiction has been a "common phenomenon in our judicial his-
tory," and where there is neither an express congressional exclusion nor
incompatibility in its exercise, the Court will affirm state court jurisdic-
tions. The Court recognized that "diversities and conflicts" may occur as
a result of this concurrent jurisdiction, but that "[tjo resolve and ac-
commodate such diversities and conflicts is one of the traditional func-
tions of th[e] Court." Id. at 507-08, 514. See also Brown v. Gerdes,
321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v.
Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S.
1, 56-59 (1911); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1884); Claflin
v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
10. 369 U.S. at 104.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
eral possible sources of this law. First, the federal courts could
sit as common law courts and create a federal common law of
labor arbitration. Second, courts might read the Federal Arbi-
tration Act' to apply to labor arbitrations. This approach, how-
ever, might be contrary to certain implications of the Lincoln
Mills opinion.1 2 Finally, courts might hold that state arbitration
statutes are to be incorporated by reference into the body of
federal arbitration law. Even if courts hold that the law gov-
erning suits to enforce arbitration agreements is to be federal
common law, both the Federal Arbitration Act and the state arbi-
tration statutes might be used as references by courts exercising
their common law powers. It is this latter approach that has
been chosen by a substantial number of courts.
13
A. FEERAL COMMON LAW
A group of three Supreme Court cases, popularly referred to
as the Steelworkers Trilogy,'4 has outlined the scope of judicial
treatment of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements subject to section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. These cases reflect a conscious choice of arbitration
as the most suitable forum for applying "the common law of the
shop" to resolve disputes between parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Where it is clear that the parties have selected
arbitration as the means of settling a particular dispute, the
courts will not, either initially or upon review, rule on the merits
of the dispute. While the Court did set up a standard for review-
ing an arbitrator's decision, that standard is concerned primarily
with abuse of the power granted to the arbitrator under the col-
lective agreement and not with the review of procedural deci-
sions made by the arbitrator where the agreement provides him
with no guidance.
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,15 the
first case of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court faced the issue of
whether a grievance should be submitted to arbitration. The
Court warned that the judiciary must not undertake to deter-
mine the merits of a grievance ujider the guise of interpreting
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
12. See text accompanying notes 33-41 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 43-51 infra.
14. United Steelworkers v. American MAfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
15. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
[Vol. 59:109
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the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements (i.e.,
by deciding whether a particular dispute is subject to the arbi-
tration clause in the agreement), for to do so would be to usurp
"a function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitra-
tion tribunal."'16 In so holding the Court rejected the reasoning
of such cases as International Association of Machinists v. Cutler-
Hammer, Inc.,11 where it was held that if the meaning of a dis-
puted contract provision is, in the court's judgment, subject to
only one interpretation, arbitration of the dispute may be en-
joined. Instead, Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, adopted
the view that even "frivolous claims" should be arbitrated.'
The second case of the Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co.,' 9 also involved the arbitrability of
grievances. The Court, citing Lincoln Mills, recognized that fed-
eral policy favored promotion of industrial stability through the
collective bargaining agreement. Citing an article by Professor
Cox, 20 the Court stated that the collective bargaining agreement
calls into being a "new common law-the common law of a partic-
ular industry or of a particular plant."''2 Thus, the first two
cases of the Steelworkers Trilogy established a policy of giving
great deference to the arbitrator in matters of substantive law.
The third case of the Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp.,22 supports this policy but limits the
power of the arbitrator in certain ways. In that case, the Court
reversed a Fourth Circuit holding that an arbitrator's award was
unenforceable. Petitioner-union and respondent-employer had a
collective bargaining agreement which provided that any differ-
ences "as to the meaning and application" of the agreement
should be submitted to arbitration and that the arbitrator's de-
cision "shall be final and binding on the parties.12 3  The Court
stated that the courts must, in most instances, defer to a contract
provision in the interests of finality since "[i] t is the arbitrator's
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitra-
16. Id. at 569.
17. 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
18. "The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic
values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment may
be quite unaware." 363 U.S. at 568.
19. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
20. Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAhv. L. REv. 1482
(1959).
21. 363 U.S. at 579.
22. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23. Id. at 594.
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tor's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts
have no business overruling him because their interpretation of
the contract is different from his. '24 Despite this extensive def-
erence given an arbitrator's decisions, the Court did place some
limitations on the arbitrator's power:
[Ain arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity
to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforce-
ment of the award.25
Absent a finding that a particular arbitration statute is spe-
cifically applicable, this broad standard of Enterprise Wheel is
the foundation to which courts have looked in developing guide-
lines for reviewing the arbitration process. In this endeavor,
they have been limited by the mandate of American Manufactur-
ing and Warrior & Gulf Navigation which dictates that the ar-
bitrator should decide the merits. Since the Enterprise Wheel
standard is concerned primarily with the parameters of an arbi-
trator's jurisdictional powers under the collective agreement, it
does not provide specific limitations on his power over proce-
dure; rather, it merely establishes the basis for such limitations.
The specific procedural limitations must evolve from the devel-
oping federal substantive law.
B. FEDERAL ARBrrRATION ACT
While Lincoln Mills, Lucas Flour, and subsequent cases dem-
onstrate that federal substantive law must be applied where the
collective bargaining agreement is within the scope of section 301,
the question remains whether common law or statutory law is to
be applied in the review of an arbitrator's procedural decisions.
The Federal Arbitration Act 26 is the sole statute in which
Congress has addressed the subject of arbitration comprehen-
sively. Specific application of the provisions of that statute to the
review of procedural decisions of arbitrators would not only en-
hance the concreteness of the standards of review but also pre-
empt the judicial standard that has evolved from the Steel-
workers Trilogy.27 The standards set forth in the Act are pref-
24. Id. at 599.
25. Id. at 597.
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
27. Markham, Judicial Review of an Arbitrator's Award under Sec-
[Vol. 59:109
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erable because they are far more explicit and carefully prescribed
than the judicial standard that has evolved from the Steel-
workers Trilogy in general and from Enterprise Wheel in par-
ticular. The specific statutory standards 28 would make a subse-
quent evaluation of the procedural fairness of a particular pro-
ceeding much easier than it would be under a strict common law
approach. These standards give the parties to an arbitration
agreement, absent any contractual provisions to the contrary, a
definite statement of what is expected of them, thereby eliminat-
ing much of the uncertainty necessarily present under the com-
mon law approach.
For example, section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
sets forth the grounds for vacating an award, permits an inquiry
into the procedural integrity of the arbitration process. Subsec-
tions (a), (b), and (c) of section 10 require vacation of an award
because of procedural infirmities:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.29
One particularly troublesome problem to which these standards
might be applied arises where the arbitrator seeks to hold the
hearing at a time when a principal witness is unavailable. Un-
der the above standards, a party to the proceeding might argue
that the arbitrator's decision constitutes (1) evident partiality
such that vacation of the award under section 10 (b) is required
tion 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 39 TENN. L. REV.
613, 642 (1972).
28. The Federal Arbitration Act recognizes the validity and irrevo-
cability of written agreements to arbitrate, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and pre-
scribes procedures for ordering a stay of court proceedings where there
is an arbitrable grievance at issue, id. § 3, for compelling arbitration and
for determining arbitrability, id. § 4, for appointing arbitrators, id. § 5,
for making proper application to the court, id. § 6, for compelling the
attendance of witnesses, id. § 7, for confirming the award of the arbitra-
tor, id. § 9, for vacating an award and for rehearing, id. § 10, for modify-
ing or correcting an award, id. § 11, and for specifically enforcing the
award, id. § 13.
29. Id. § 10(a) - (c). A remedy for the abuse of an arbitrator's
power is provided by subsection (d), which requires vacation of an
award "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made." Id. § 10 (d).
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and (2) misconduct or misbehavior by which his rights have
'been prejudiced, thereby requiring vacation under section 10(c).
A party could also contend, in appropriate circumstances, that cri-
teria which make the time of hearing important-i.e., the avail-
ability of evidence and witnesses, so that a complete hearing on
the merits may be had-apply with equal force to the place of
hearing.
Despite the apparent value of the Act in the conduct of labor
arbitration proceedings, there remains some question as to
whether it is applicable to them. Although it does provide that
any maritime, international, or interstate contractual obligation
to arbitrate controversies between parties "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract,"30 the legislative his-
tory and language of the Act indicate that Congress may have in-
tended it to apply only to commercial contracts.31 This inter-
pretation finds support in a provision placed in the Act as a re-
sult of labor objections to the inclusion of industrial arbitra-
tion. It states that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."32
A number of lower courts have disregarded this language,
however, and have held that the remedial scheme established by
the Federal Arbitration Act is applicable to arbitration actions
founded on section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.3 3
30. Id. § 2.
31. See Note, Federal Enforcement of Grievance Arbitration Provi-
sions under the Doctrine of Lincoln Mills, 42 MnqN. L. REv. 1139, 1142
(1958).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See Burstein, The United States Arbitration
Act-A Reevaluation, 3 V.L. L. REv. 125, 130 (1958).
33. Post-Lincoln Mills: Electronics Corp. v. International Elec.
Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. General Elec. Co., 406 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Stereotyp-
ers Local 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); Mogge v. Machinists Dist. 8, 387 F.2d 880
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968); Pietro Scalzitti Co. v.
Operating Eng'rs Local 150, 351 ,F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965); Technical
Eng'rs Local 149 v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958); Hill v. Aro Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482 (N.D.
Ohio 1967); Machinists Local 1416 v. Jostens, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 496 (D.
Minn. 1966); cf. Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 12 (6th Cir.
1965).
Pre-Lincoln Mills: Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec.
Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957);
Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st
Cir. 1956), affd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Hoover Motor Ex-
press Co. v. Teamsters Local 327, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954); Tenney
Eng'r, Inc. v. Local 437, United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 59:109
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These courts have done so by declaring either that the afore-
mentioned exclusion in section 1 of the statute does not apply to
collective bargaining agreements, 34 or that if the exclusion does
apply, it is limited to collective bargaining agreements covering
workers actually in the transportation industries. 36 Other courts
have held that the Act is not applicable.3 6 Although presented
with an opportunity to do so in Lincoln Mills,31 the Supreme
Court has not ruled on this question. In that case, the Fifth Cir-
cuit had found the Act inapplicable. The Supreme Court majority
should therefore have made some reference to that finding; since
none was made, it may be that the Court accepted sub silentio the
decision of the lower court on this issue.38 This interpretation is
supported by the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter,
which stated that the silent treatment given the Federal Ar-
bitration Act -by the majority was a rejection, though not explicit,
of the availability of that Act to enforce arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements.3 9 In light of his unaccepted in-
vitation to make the rejection explicit,40 however, the Court's si-
lence on this point may also ,be interpreted as a simple refusal to
34. See Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233
F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), af'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957) ("We follow in part
a different path than the Court of Appeals, though we reach the same
result." Id. at 548) (a collective bargaining agreement between a union
and an employer is not a "contract of employment" within the meaning
of 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
35. See Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. Local 437, United Elec. Workers, 207
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) operates to exclude, along
with seamen and railroad employees, only those other classes of workers
who are actually engaged in movement of interstate or foreign com-
merce or in work so closely related as to be in practical effect a part
of it).
36. See Markham, supra note 27, at 643 n.194.
37. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court held that under section 301 the
district court properly decreed specific performance of an agreement to
arbitrate. It could have held that the Federal Arbitration Act was appli-
cable and that the order was proper under section 4 of the Act.
38. For a view that use of the Federal Arbitration Act has been tac-
itly rejected by the Supreme Court, see Smith & Jones, The Supreme
Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63
MxcH. L. REv. 751, 801, 802 n.120 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Smith &
Jones].
39. 353 U.S. at 466 (dissenting opinion); see Technical Eng'rs Local
149 v. General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 938 (1958) (assumption that the Federal Arbitration Act is inappli-
cable to collective bargaining agreements).
40. Mr. Justice Frankfurter called on the majority to "make this re-jection explicit" and to recognize that "when Congress passed legislation
to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by the federal courts,
it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts." 35S
V,S. gt 466 (disgenting opinion),
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reach an issue unnecessary to its decision. 41
Thus, there may be two ways in which a party receiving an
adverse arbitration award can invoke the specific standards of the
Federal Arbitration Act in challenging that decision. The party
may rely upon the previously mentioned lower court decisions
which construe the Act as controlling the arbitration of dis-
putes under a collective bargaining agreement, thereby excluding
any common law to the contrary;42 or he may argue that even
though the Supreme Court has not expressly adopted the statu-
tory standards as part of federal substantive law, these stand-
ards represent the sole comprehensive congressional expression of
federal arbitration policy and therefore should 'be viewed by
the courts as indicating proper operating procedure in the con-
duct of arbitration proceedings.
The latter argument can be supported in two ways. First,
even before Lincoln Mills the Federal Arbitrarion Act had
proved useful to courts faced with the problem of fashioning a
body of common law to deal with arbitration questions. As
early as 1953, Judge Wyzanski determined in Textile Workers v.
American Thread Co.43 that section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act demanded a judicially-created body of law; he then
turned to the Arbitration Act as a "guiding analogy" in ruling
that if the parties failed to agree on an arbitrator within ten
days, the court would appoint one.4 4 Second, it has been argued
that the Supreme Court itself has shown an intent to parallel the
principal provisions of the Arbitration Act. The holding in Lin-
coln Mills that the courts can compel specific performance of
the arbitration promise made substantive law at least as far-
reaching as section 4 of the Act, which requires compliance with
strict procedural requirements before specific performance is
granted. Lincoln Mills also made it clear that the new com-
mon law, like section 2 of the Arbitration Act, renders a contract
to submit future disputes to arbitration as valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable as any other contract. Further, the power to stay
proceedings pending arbitration, comparable to the power
granted in section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, cannot sen-
sibly be denied a court empowered to hear a separate suit to
41. Dunau, Scope of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards,
24 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 175, 182 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dunau].
42. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
43. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
44. 113 F. Supp. at 142, discussed in Note, The Common Law of
Grievance Arbitration: New Wine in Old Bottles, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 494,
498 (1964).
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enforce the same arbitration. Thus, in one decision, the Court es-
sentially adopted what Judge Magruder called "the heart of the
United States Arbitration Act... contained in sections 2, 3, 4."45
The Supreme Court has expressly considered only one other
common-law provision that parallels the Arbitration Act. In
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,46 the Court
reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that an arbitrator's award
is enforceable even where the underlying collective bargaining
agreement has expired in the interim between the occurrence of
the incident and the award.47 This decision in effect affirmed a
common-law principle comparable to the grant to the courts in
section 9 of the Arbitration Act of the power to enforce an
award.
Despite this limited Supreme Court guidance, however, the
lower courts have continued to look to the provisions of the Ar-
bitration Act in fashioning the common law.48  This approach
of using the Federal Arbitration Act as a guide rather than as a
set of controlling standards appears to be the favored approach
in dealing with collective bargaining agreements found to "affect
interstate conmerce. 1
49
C. STATE ARBITRATION ACTS
Since the Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour decisions were
handed down, state arbitration acts have become useful primarily
45. Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85, 97 (1st Cir. 1956), afi'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), dis-
cussed in Note, supra note 44, at 499-500.
46. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
47. Id. at 596, 599.
48. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers,
171 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Conn. 1959), where the court said: "There can
be little doubt that the United States Arbitration Act is a part of the
body of the federal labor law to which courts may look in defining fed-
eral law under [section 301] .... " (citing the pre-Lincoln Mills case of
Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956)).
49. In a companion case to Lincoln Mills, Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v.
Textile Workers Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550 (1957), the Court held that an
order directing arbitration was a "final decision" that could be appealed,
and that contrary judicial rulings based on the Federal Arbitration Act
(see, e.g., Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935); In re
Pahlberg, 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1942)) were not applicable. Thus it is
apparent that not all procedural law developed in cases under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act can be considered controlling in labor law cases. For
an interpretation of Lincoln Mills and its two companion cases as a state-
ment by the Court that the Federal Arbitration Act should be used as
"a guiding analogy," see 0. FAIRWEATRm, PRACTICE AM POCEDURE IN LA-
BOR ARBITRATION 3-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAIwErTur].
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as guides for the formulation of federal substantive law. As the
Court stated in Lincoln Mills, "state law, if compatible with the
purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy."50 In deciding arbi-
tration cases, state courts thus frequently look to their own arbi-
tration acts as embodiments of federal policy.51
Seventeen states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act."
Similar in many respects to the Federal Arbitration Act,53 the
Act establishes procedures which are essentially the same as those
found in the federal statute, and it is primarily in these areas
that the Uniform Act may be of value in formulating federal
substantive law. For example, the Uniform Act provides for ma-
jority action by arbitrators,54 gives the arbitrator the authority
to set the time and place of the hearing and sets forth other hear-
50. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957),
citing Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939).
See also Machinists Local 1416 v. Jostens, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 496 (D. Minn.
1966), where the court stated that even if the Minnesota Arbitration Act
were not applicable per se to a federal action brought in Minnesota to
compel an employer to submit to arbitration of a dispute arising out of
an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement, it was part of
that body of federal law to which courts could resort in implementing
federal policy.
51. FA wEATmm, supra note 49, at 5. See generally Carpenters Lo-
cal 2131 v. Aetna Steel Prods. Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 717 (C.P. Schuylkill
Co., Pa. 1960); Comment, The Applicability of State Arbitration Statutes
to Proceedings Subject to LMRA Section 301, OHIo STATE L.J. 692 (1966).
52. The Uniform Arbitration Act was written in 1955 and subse-
quently adopted in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. For the
particular variations adopted by each state, see UNiFonm ARBrrARTioN
ACT (U.L.A.) §§ 1-25 (annotations).
53. Both acts recognize the validity and irrevocability of written
agreements to arbitrate, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), U~xroam ARBmATio N ACT
§ 1; and prescribe procedures for ordering a stay of court proceedings,
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), UIoRm ARBrmAi N AcT § 2; for compelling arbitra-
tion and for determining arbitrability, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), UNiFoRm AR-
BnRATioN AT § 2; for appointing arbitrators, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), UNI-
FORM ARBrATioN AcT § 3; for making proper application to the court,
9 U.S.C. § 6 (1970), Uiomvr ARMTRATION AcT § 16; for compelling the
attendance of witnesses, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1970), UmiFoRm ARBImRATION ACT
§ 7; for confirming the award of the arbitrator, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), UNI-
FoRm ARB ATION AcT § 11; for vacating an award and for a rehearing,
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970), UNIFoRm ARBIRATION ACT § 12; for judicial modify-
ing or correcting of an award, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1970), U~NioRm ARBITRATION
ACT § 13; for filing timely motions to vacate or modify the award, 9
U.S.C. § 12 (1970), UNiFoRm ARBITRATION ACT §§ 12, 13; and for obtaining
enforcement of the award, 9 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), UiwoRm ARBITRAT=ON
ACT §§ 14, 15.
54. UNiFoRM Amrra3ATioN ACT § 4,
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ing procedures, 5  grants an absolute right to the participants to
be represented by an attorney,5 6 permits the use of depositions, 57
requires the arbitrator's award to be in writing,58 sets forth a pro-
cedure for petitioning the arbitrator for a modification or cor-
rection of the award, 9 defines venue requirements, ° enumerates
the specific court orders from which an appeal may be taken,61
and declares that the "act shall 'be so construed as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it."162
It should be noted that in neither the Federal nor the Uniform
Act is there an attempt to prescribe the manner in which the
arbitrator's hearing shall be conducted. It is apparently assumed
that the traditional informality of such hearings will be contin-
ued. Witnesses may, but need not, be sworn; technical objections
to the reception of evidence are not permitted; and affidavits,
signed statements, and hearsay may be received. The parties,
however, are free to urge upon the arbitrator the value that such
evidence does or does not have. There is no requirement that
there be findings of fact by the arbitrators and none need be
made,0 3 although there is no prohibition against such findings
and "the arbitrator will usually be well advised to state the rea-
sons for his decision and award."6 4
II. SELECTION OF A FORUM FOR APPEALING THE
ARBITRATION AWARD
In deciding whether to appeal an arbitration award, a party
should consider the characteristics of and potential remedies
available from four different forums: the arbitrator, the Na-
55. Id. § 5.
56. Id. § 6.
57. Id. § 7.
58. Id. § 8.
59. Id. § 9.
60. Id. § 18.
61. Id. § 19.
62. Id. § 21.
63. See McQuaid Mkt. House Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 254,
257, 180 N.W. 97, 98 (1920):
It is well settled, in the absence of statute otherwise providing,
that in the common-law arbitration the arbitrators need not
specify in detail the facts made the basis of their decision, but
may report the result of their deliberations in the form of gen-
eral conclusions, which determine the points involved, together
with a statement of the gross allowance made.
64. Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln
Mills Case, 42 MAbN, 14. REv, 333, 350 (1958),
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tional Labor Relations Board, state courts, and federal courts. An
appeal to the arbitrator is frequently the simplest, but his pow-
ers of review are extremely limited. The NLRB, while equipped
to handle matters which are essentially unfair labor practice is-
sues, is not particularly well suited to handle questions of basic
procedural fairness. An appeal to the courts, however, while
procedurally the most complex and often the most time-consum-
ing, insures the appellant review before a forum well-versed in
the rudiments of basic procedural fairness. The appellant's
choice of a court may be greatly influenced by the differences
in the procedural rules and requirements of federal and state
courts and of the courts of different states.
A. PETITIONING THE ARBITRATOR
It is . . . [a] fundamental common law principle that once an
arbitrator has made and published a final award his authority
is exhausted and he is functus officio and can do nothing more
in regard to the subject matter of the arbitration. 65
This general rule results from the unwillingness of courts to
allow a nonjudicial officer, who acts sporadically without fol-
lowing formal procedures, to reexamine a final decision once he
has rendered it. One rationale behind the rule is that "the po-
tential evil of outside communication and unilateral influence"
which might affect a new conclusion is minimized if an arbitrator
is not allowed to modify his decisions. 66 Furthermore, if an arbi-
trator could freely change his mind, the purpose of the arbitra-
tion agreement-the prevention of industrial strife--would be
frustrated. 67 In the words of one court, once an arbitrator makes
an award, "the rights of the parties to that award are vested
and cannot be destroyed by a later attempted modification" of
65. LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d
Cir. 1967). The general rule was enunciated as early as 1805 in Henfree
v. Bromley, 6 East 309, 102 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1805). See also Bayne
v. Morris, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 97 (1863), in which the Court said:
Arbitrators exhaust their power when they make a final deter-
mination on the matters submitted to them. They have no
power after having made an award to alter it; the authority con-
ferred on them is then at an end.
Id. at 99.
66. LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3d
Cir. 1967). See also Local 35, Newspaper Guild v. Washington Post Co.,
442 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Parker v. Mercury Freight Lines,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 789, 795 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
67. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980,
982 (10th Cir. 1951); Parker v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
789, 794 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
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the award.6 8 This rule of finality is additionally buttressed by
the traditional view of the solemnity of all judgments. 69
The common law principle of finality has been limited by
the courts, however, to allow resubmission of awards to the arbi-
trator in certain instances. The courts may remit an award
where it is patently ambiguous, indefinite, unclear, incomplete,
or self-contradictory. 70 Absent contrary statutory principles,
there is strong authority for requiring ajiy further consideration
of the award by the arbitrator to be obtained, not by petitioning
the arbitrator directly, but by requesting the court to resubmit
the dispute.71 Furthermore, there is no legal basis for any at-
68. Loyal Band or Group of Creek Indians v. United States, 97 F.
Supp. 426 (Ct. CL), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 813 (1951), cited in Parker v.
Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 789, 795 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
69. LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 & n.15
(3d Cir. 1967). In Parker v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., the court stated
that while
there are differences in the nature and purpose of labor arbitra-
tion and commercial arbitration which depending on the issue
before the court could make holdings in the commercial context
irrelevant in the labor context .... [t]here is nothing so pe-
culiarly different between a commercial arbitration dispute and
a labor arbitration dispute that would make the general princi-
ples regarding finality... even though pronounced in the com-
mercial context, any the less applicable ... in the labor context.
307 F. Supp. 789, 795 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
70. E.g., United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424,
433 n.10 (1966); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co., 324 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1963); International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 300 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1962); Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Shipbuilding Workers Local 15, 242 F. Supp. 606, 611-12(D.N.J. 1965); Transport Workers Local 234 v. Philadelphia Transporta-
tion Co., 228 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
71. Union Local 679 v. Richmond-Chase Corp., 191 Cal. App. 2d 841,
13 CaL Rptr. 341 (1961) (arbitrators have no authority to order a rehear-
ing); see generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 200, 220-25 (1971). Courts have
directed a hearing de novo before the same arbitrator where the award
covered matters beyond submission, Kollsman Instrument Corp. v. Cri-
velli, 24 App. Div. 2d 865, 264 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1965), or the meaning of the
award was unclear, Kennedy v. Continental Transportation Lines, Inc.,
230 F. Supp. 760, 763 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Transport Workers Local 234 v.
Philadelphia Transportation Co., 228 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Courts
have also directed a hearing before a new arbitrator where proffered evi-
dence was found by the court to be so relevant that its exclusion by the
arbitrator denied a fair hearing. Smaglio v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 432
Pa. 133, 247 A.2d 577 (1968). See FAmWEATHER, supra note 49, at 371.
The power to remand will not be exercised unless there is patent am-
biguity in the decision or the text of it is not germane to the issue
presented as reflected by the record of the proceedings. To re-
mand under any other circumstances, the courts have said, would
be to suggest to the arbitrator that the court differed in opinion with
the result which he had reached on the merits and would constitute an
intrusion upon his exclusive function of passing upon the merits of the
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tempt by either party to reopen the hearing for a reconsidera-
tion of the merits, although at least one arbitrator has approved
such reconsideration in certain circumstances.7 2
There seems to be a dichotomy between theory and prac-
tice here, since arbitrators do occasionally reopen a hearing for
the purpose of correcting ambiguities and inconsistencies, even
after an award has been made. For example, in American Bak-
ery and Confectionary Workers v. National Biscuit Co.,73
the court recognized without comment the fact that the em-
ployer in that case had attempted to clarify an award inform-
ally by correspondence with the arbitrator. The court seemingly
grievance. Machinists Local 1893 v. Aerojet-General Corp., 263 F. Supp.
343, 346 (C.D. Cal. 1966); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Shipbuilding Workers
Union, 242 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D.N.J. 1965).
However, the rehearing order is not a judicial invasion of the arbitra-
tor's province, but rather serves to give the parties what they bargained
for-a clear decision from the arbitrators. Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., 397 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968).
72. In Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 845 (1947), arbi-
trator McCoy found that although it is settled that in the absence of a
specific stipulation arbitrators are without power to act further after ren-
dering a final award, an exception to that principle is proper in cases of
fundamental mistake of fact apparent in the award or record. McCoy
stated that such an exception is justified (1) by analogy to the right of
courts to amend their decisions "nunc pro tunc" after their general pow-
ers have expired; and (2) on the theory that such an award, based on
fundamental error of fact, is void and therefore not an award at all. To
rule that arbitrators may not amend such awards would render arbitra-
tion a cause of litigation rather than a substitute for it. It was the intent
of McCoy to limit reconsideration to awards that could be successfully
impeached in court. Id. at 869. It should be noted, however, that this
case involved arbitration of contract terms, and, as McCoy recognizes,
such arbitration "differs radically from arbitration of grievances." Id.
at 848. Furthermore, the arbitration agreement in this case contained a
provision for interpretation of an award in certain circumstances. Id. at
865.
With this view should be compared Waterfront Employers Ass'n of
Pacific Coast, 9 Lab. Arb. 5 (1947). In that case the arbitrator stated
that an arbitration agreement which provides that awards are "final and
binding upon the parties," but which also contains a very broad definition
of arbitrable matters, may be construed to permit the arbitrator to rehear
the issue upon which the prior award was rendered and, upon a prop&r.
showing, to modify, supersede, or set aside a prior award under the same
contract. Id. at 16-17.
The case law in this area, however, consistently denies arbitrators
independent authority to reconsider the merits. See, e.g., Mercury Oil
Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951) (ar-
bitrators have no authority to enter a second award modifying their first
award on a dispute growing out of the discharge of an employee, where
the first award purported on its face to be complete and final and did
not indicate any intention of arbitrators to reserve to themselves any
matters for further consideration and determination).
73. 378 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1967).
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ignored the effect of this informal action and based its decision
on a reading of the arbitrator's opinion alone.74 Of course, when
both parties to the arbitration join in requesting the arbitrator
to modify or correct the award, the arbitrator's authority to act
is clear. 75
The strongest argument for allowing a direct, unilateral ap-
peal to the arbitrator for a change in the award can be made by
attempting to incorporate into federal substantive law, by anal-
ogy, the provision in many state arbitration acts which allows
such a petition by one of the parties. 76 Even where controlling,
however, this statutory provision is extremely limited. It does
not allow a review of the merits of the decision, but merely
modification or correction where
[t]here was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property re-
ferred to in the award; [or]
[t~he award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy. 77
Thus, the arbitrator's legitimate scope of review over his own
award is very narrow. If it does appear that the award may ,be
appropriately modified by resubmission to the arbitrator, how-
ever, a request for resubmission should properly be made to a
court of appropriate jurisdiction. For example, where a party
has been denied the benefit of a key witness's testimony due to
the arbitrator's selection of an inconvenient time or place for the
hearing, a request for resubmission on such grounds would
probably fail because it is outside the arbitrator's ambit of re-
view. Instead, the aggrieved party should petition the court for
review.
74. Id. at 926.
75. Eveleth v. Chase, 17 Mass. 458 (1821) (arbitrators under a parol
submission may make a valid supplementary award with the parol con-
sent of both parties). See Annot., 104 A.L.R. 710, 716 (1936).
76. It may be argued that such statutes reflect the federal labor pol-
icy. See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra. Also, for an argument
that the "functus officio" doctrine as applied to arbitrators was specifi-
cally rejected in Enterprise Wheel and should no longer be applied,
thereby permitting unilateral appeals to arbitrators, see FAmw ATE=, su-
pra note 49, at 348-51. Fairweather's view, as it applies to unilateral ap-
peals to the arbitrator, is not the generally accepted one, however.
77. Uiomv ARBnxTFATiON AcT (U.L.A.) § 13(a) (1), (3). Similar
provisions are also present in several states where the Uniform Act has
not been enacted. See FAmwEaTmm, supra note 49, at 348 (collecting
statutes).
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B. PETITIONING THE NLRB vERsus PETITIONING THE CouRTs
The jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the National Labor
Relations Board often overlap, because (1) many grievances
made arbitrable by a collective bargaining agreement can be
framed to encompass an unfair labor practice,78 and (2) a major-
ity of collective agreements incorporate one or more provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby making many
breaches of contract statutory violations as well.7 0 The Board
and the courts presently have concurrent jurisdiction over con-
duct that allegedly constitutes both an unfair labor practice and
a breach of the collective 'bargaining agreement.80
In the face of possible conflicting determinations between
arbitrators and the courts on the one hand, and the National La-
bor Relations Board on the other, the Supreme Court, without ar-
ticulating its rationale, held in Smithl v. Evening News Asso-
ciation that litigants have a choice of forum.8 ' The effect of this
decision was a quiet liquidation of the preemption doctrine set
out in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,82 which
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Board with respect to con-
duct arguably protected by section 7 or arguably prohibited by
section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The impact
of Smith has been to shift significant decision-making power
from the Board to arbitrators and the courts.
Under existing law the National Labor Relations Board en-
gages in limited review of arbitration awards. In Spielberg Man-
ufacturing Co.,8 3 the Board, following the statutory policy of en-
78. NATIONAL AcAnEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB,
AND THE COURTS 121-22 (20th annual meeting 1967) (statement of E.
Lewis).
79. Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices:
Jurisdictional Problems, 57 COLuM. L. REv. 52, 68, 69 (1957).
80. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. George E.
Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1967). For a brief history
of the development of the law defining the relationship between arbitra-
tors, the NLRB, and the courts, see Note, Deference of Jurisdiction by
the National Labor Relations Board and the Arbitration Clause, 25 VAND.
L. REv. 1057, 1058-59 (1972).
81. 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962). The danger of conflict is mitigated by
the requirement that the courts under section 301 must apply principles
of federal law which, of course, will include the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. For an analysis of the Court's handling of the preemption
problem under section 301, see Sovern, Section 301 and Primary Jurisdic-
tion -f the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1962).
82. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
83. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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couraging the voluntary resolutions of disputes, adopted a three-
pronged test to determine when it would defer to the decision
of the arbitrator. The Board will defer where (1) the arbitra-
tion proceedings appear to have been fair and regular; (2) all
parties have agreed to be bound by those proceedings; and (3)
the arbitration decision is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the labor laws.8 4 The Supreme Court, in holding
that a dispute which may be cognizable under the National La-
bor Relations Act may still be submitted to arbitration, noted
the Spielberg doctrine and quoted approvingly from one of the
Board's earlier applications of it.85
Where any of the three requirements cited in Spielberg are
not met, the Board will not defer. Intervention by the Board is
one of the safeguards afforded the individual grievant who may
.be faced with representation at an arbitration hearing by an un-
sympathetic union. 6 Furthermore, if grounds for alleging an
unfair labor practice can 'be found, a victim of an unfair proceed-
ing can appeal to the Board to intervene in his behalf. The
Board, however, will not allow a second hearing merely because
an unfair labor practice could be found to exist.8 7
84. Id.
85. Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964). The
Court adopted the words of International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923,
925-26 (1962):
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from
adjudicating unfair labor practice charges even though they
might have been the subject of an arbitration proceeding and
award.... However, it is equally well established that the
Board has considerable discretion to respect an arbitration
award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair
labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of
the Act.
See Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
86. Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J.
1191, 1195 (1968).
87. In Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 600 (1946), the Board
deferred to an arbitrator's decision despite the fact that the Board could
have found that an unfair labor practice had been committed. The Board
was unwilling to allow the union a second hearing after it had initially
lost its case at arbitration.
It has been argued that the NLRB should refrain entirely from re-
viewing arbitration awards, even though representation and unfair labor
practice questions are present. Such cases are primarily concerned with
contract questions that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration
or that have been decided by the arbitrator. Furthermore, the two pri-
mary functions performed in an arbitration case are contract interpreta-
tion and enforcement-both tasks for which the courts are better suited
than the Board. Thus, it is argued, the jurisdiction of the Board should
not be extended to oust courts from section 301 cases. Wollett, The In-
terpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who Should Have
Primary Jurisdiction?, 10 LAB. L.J. 477 (1959); Note, Federal Enforce-
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C. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL COURTS AND THE REVERSE-ERIE PROBLEM
Several factors should be considered in deciding whether to
seek review in a state court of an arbitration award made pursu-
ant to a collective bargaining agreement. First, where the collec-
tive bargaining agreement affects interstate commerce, federal
substantive law is controlling.8 State arbitration statutes are
inapplicable except to the extent that they are deemed to be
rules absorbed by federal law. 9 Second, the common-law pre-
sumption is against applying state arbitration statutes to collec-
tive bargaining agreements absent a specific provision in the
agreement incorporating not just the laws of a particular state,
but the arbitration statute itself.9 0 Thus, a provision in an
agreement that it is to be governed by the laws of a particular
state would not be sufficient to rebut the common-law presump-
tion. Finally, if a claim based on a federal right is brought in a
state court, it may be removed to federal district court if it might
in the first instance have been brought there.9 1
State courts may apply their own procedural law when en-
forcing a federal right,92 but may not defeat the substance of a
federal claim under the guise of regulating procedure. 93  Thus,
ment of Grievance Arbitration Provisions under the Doctrine of Lincoln
Mills, 42 InTN. L. REV. 1139, 1161 (1958).
88. See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.89. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See
also Interstate Bakeries Corp. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 31 Ill. 2d 317,201 N.E.2d 452 (1964), in which the court held that a state constitutionalprovision forbidding arbitration of future disputes was inapplicable in an
action under section 301.
One of the incidental results of this preemption of the field by fed-
eral law is the displacement of state statutory procedural safeguards on
arbitration. For example, the federal law has not required that agree-
ments to arbitrate be in writing or that the award be in writing and be
acknowledged by the arbitrator. It is, as one commentator laments, un-fortunate that all the procedural safeguards of the state statutes havebeen thus eliminated. See HAYs, supra note 1, at 18-19.90. American Sterilizer Co. v. Local 832, UAW, 278 F. Supp. 637,640-41 (W.D. Penn. 1968). See also LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan,Inc., 378 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1967); Keller v. Teamsters Local 249, 423 Pa.353, 223 A.2d 724 (1966).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). A provision in the contract that it isto be governed by state law does not prevent removability. IngrahamCo. v. Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 171 F. Supp. 103 (D. Conn.1959); see Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1356 (1959). If, alternatively, the action isbrought in or removed to the federal court on the ground of diversity
of citizenship, the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
requires that state, rather than federal, substantive law be applied.Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
92. See Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).93. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949). As Justice
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a state court enforcing the federal right is presented with prob-
lems similar to those that confronted the federal courts after Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins:94 it must determine both the limits of the
substantive right to arbitration granted by federal law and the
points at which its own procedure may undercut that right.95
In all cases involving the enforcement of federally created rights
in state courts, proper deference must 'be given to the paramount
nature of federal law. Once the extent of the federal right is es-
tablished, the operation of local policy is to that degree pre-
empted. Moreover, according to one commentator, "federal para-
mountcy" extends as much to procedural as to substantive mat-
ters. If the federal purpose is clear, and if it is valid, there is
no room, he argues, for the type of local procedural autonomy
allowed in conflict of laws situations.9 6 Nevertheless, in the
course of developing a body of federal substantive law under sec-
tion 301 many state and federal courts have required strict com-
pliance with the different procedural requirements of their re-
spective arbitration statutes. While the federal purpose is clear
-deference to arbitration-the federal substantive law is not.
Thus the Supreme Court has recognized that in certain instances
the procedural requirements of a particular state will be adopted
as part of the federal substantive law for that state, even though
this may result in different procedural standards in different
forums.
97
Frankfurter noted,
[i] f the States afford courts for enforcing the Federal Act, they
must enforce the substance of the right given by Congress. They
cannot depreciate the legislative currency issued by Congress-
either expressly or by local methods of enforcement that accom-
plish the same result.
Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 369 (1942) (concurring opinion).
Accord, C. WRIGnT, FEDERaL CouRTs § 45 (1970).
94. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95. See Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts: Con-
verse Erie Problems, 55 Coma=FI L. REv. 623, 624-25 (1970).
96. Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The
Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 Onio ST. L.J. 384, 387 (1956). Two
other reasons have been advanced in support of applying foreign law to
a greater extent in the federal/state areas than in the normal conflicts
situation: (1) only one additional set of laws need be mastered by the
state judges, not 49; (2) it is easier to forum shop in the federal/state
situation since the shopper does not have to leave his state. Note, State
Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1551, 1557-
58 (1960).
97. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (state stat-
ute of limitations controls in the filing of a section 301 suit). See discus-
sion in text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
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D. FORUM SHOPPING
1. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Transfer
The extent to which an aggrieved party may forum shop for
a favorable set of state procedural standards to incorporate into
the federal substantive law of that district is limited by the
party's ability to (1) obtain proper venue, (2) acquire personal
jurisdiction over the adverse party, and (3) resist attempts to
have the action removed for consideration under another forum's
less favorable procedural standards. Section 301(c) of the Labor
Management Relations Act provides:
For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States,
district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor
organization (1) in the district in which such organization main-
tains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly
authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or act-
ing for employee members. 98
Although entitled "jurisdiction," the courts have uniformly
held that this section is a venue provision.9 9 As section 301 (a)
makes clear, section 301(c) prescribes the proper venue for suits
under the Labor Management Relations Act which are "brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties."' 00 The argument can be made that the venue pro-
visions of section 301(c) pertain only to labor organizations and
do not include private persons or corporations; however, section
301 (a) has also been recognized as a venue statute, and it clearly
applies to private persons and corporations-albeit subject to the
limitations of section 301(c) quoted above.' 0 '
When the forum selected is outside the state where the ad-
verse party is located, there are two requisites to the acquisition
98. 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1970).
99. Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers Local 426, 491 F.2d 245,
250 (4th Cir. 1974); Rubber Local 102 v. Lee Rubber & Tire Corp., 394 F.2d
362, 364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Franchino v. Valenti,
347 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Maritime
Union, 35 F.R.D. 365, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1964). See also Denver & R.G.W.R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562 (1967).
100. Franchino v. Valenti, 347 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. White Motor Corp. v. UAW, 491 F.2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1974);
Swanson Painting Co. v. Painters Local 260, 391 F.2d 523, 526 (1968).
Additionally, where the adverse party is a corporation there is a federal
statute of general application. It provides:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of
such corporation for venue purposes.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
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of personal jurisdiction. The first is effective service of process.
The second is sufficient contacts between the party and the
forum state to insure that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 02
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) provides in relevant part:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United
States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state. 03
While it has been argued that section 301(d) authorizes nation-
wide service of process for section 301 actions, this argument has
been found to be without merit.10 4 Thus, the procedure to be
followed in the district courts in obtaining personal service upon
a party not an inhabitant of, or found within, the state where
the district court is located is governed by Rule 4(e) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides that whenever a
statute or rule of court of the state in which the federal district
court is located allows service of a summons upon a party not
an inhabitant of, or found within, the state, service may be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in
the statute or rule. Therefore, any extraterritorial service provi-
sions of the state in which the district court is held are available
under Rule 4(e).10 5
102. Swanson Painting Co. v. Painters Local 260, 391 F.2d 523, 524(9th Cir. 1968). As to the latter factor, see International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
103. Additionally, Rule 4(f) permits service out of the state but not
more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced,
or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial, on parties brought into
the action under Rules 14 or 19.
104. Section 301(d) provides:
The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of
any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor
organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service
upon the labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (d) (1970). In Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers
Local 426, 491 F.2d 245 (1974), plaintiff argued that this section author-
izes service of process upon unions to be effected anywhere in the United
States. The court rejected this contention, stating that the purpose
of the section was to make it clear that a union, although an unincor-
porated association, could sue and be sued. By providing that the service
of summons upon an agent of a union would be adequate to subject a
union to the jurisdiction of the federal court issuing the summons, the
Congress had removed a major obstacle to suing unions. Id. at 249. The
only other court to have considered this contention also rejected it. Daily
Review Corp. v. Typographical Union, 9 F.R.D. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
105. Most states have substitute service of process provisions as part
of their long-arm statutes which are adequate to effect service upon em-
ployers amenable to suit in a district court held in such state on an action
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A second requisite to acquiring personal jurisdiction is set
out in Hanson v. Denckla,106 where the Supreme Court indicated
that activities within a state which qualify as "contacts" for the
purpose of meeting the "minimum contacts" requirement must be
of a kind which show that the defendant "purposefully avails it-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."'10 7
Finally, in actions brought under section 301, there is authority
for the proposition that where the federal district court has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, it also has venue in the
action.108
While a party appealing an arbitrator's decision may be able
to obtain venue and personal jurisdiction in a favorable forum,
the advantages gained by forum shopping may be lost if the de-
fendant is able to remove the action to a different forum and
thus subject it to less favorable procedural standards. Changes
of venue may be obtained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which pro-
vides:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.
The Reviser's Notes state that "Subsection (a) was drafted in ac-
cordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting
transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is
proper."' 0 9 However the statute is more than a mere codifica-
tion of this common law doctrine, for the Supreme Court has
held that
Congress, by the term "for the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice," intended to permit courts to
under section 301 (a). See, e.g., Swanson Painting Co. v. Painters Local
260, 391 F.2d 523, 524-25 (1968). Where the defendant is a corporation
authorized to do business in the forum state, service of process is simpli-
fied by provisions in state corporation statutes which require the designa-
tion of agents to receive process. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
AcT § 115 (1969).
106. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
107. Id. at 253. It should be noted, however, that where plaintiff's
injury does not arise out of something done in the forum state, the other
contacts between the defendant and the forum state may need to be
fairly extensive before the burden of defending a suit there will be im-
posed on defendant. These extensive contacts are necessary so that "tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are not offended. The
matter is one of fairness in balancing interests, hardships, and advan-
tages. F. JAmES, Czvm PocEDURE § 12.8 (1965).
108. Swanson Painting Co. v. Painters Local 260, 391 F.2d 523, 526-
27 (9th Cir. 1968).
109. Quoted in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 34 (1955).
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grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience. This is
not to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the
plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that
the discretion to be exercised is broader. 110
One recurring reason for plaintiff's choice of an inconvenient
forum is to obtain the benefit of a more favorable statute of limi-
tation than those found in states where the suit would be more
convenient and would ordinarily be brought. For example, a
party adversely affected by a late award would be interested in
finding a state that renders an arbitration award void if it is not
issued within three months of the completion of the hearing.1 1'
The prevailing judicial attitude has been one of "indulgent toler-
ance toward such forum-shopping as is induced by the vagaries
of limitations in the conflict of laws." 2 This attitude has found
expression in various devices for allowing the plaintiff to keep
the legal advantage which he gained by his original choice of
forum where that was a permissible choice. Thus, some courts
which apply forum non conveniens have declined to dismiss on
that ground,113 and others have made their dismissals condition-
al."'1 Under section 1404(a), several courts have exacted as a
condition of transfer a stipulation that the defendant would not
plead the statute of limitation." 5 And some courts have held
that the law of the transferor court continues to apply after the
transfer.116
110. Id. at 32. See also All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d
1010 (3d Cir. 1952); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warren Co., 177
F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
111. Of course, the petitioning party would still have to argue that
the requirement is mandatory, and not merely directory. See text ac-
companying notes 131-33 infra.
112. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm.
L. REv. 405, 474 (1955).
113. Id. at 471 n.148 (collecting cases).
114. See F. JAmvs, C=nr PRocEDuR § 12.17 (1965).
115. See, e.g., Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Indus., 177 F. Supp. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
116. See, e.g., Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th
Cir. 1950), where plaintiff, a Missouri citizen, brought an action in a New
Mexico state court against a Kansas railroad corporation doing business
in New Mexico for injuries sustained in California. The defendant re-
moved to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
The court of appeals held that the district court erred in assuming that,
upon transfer to the District of California under section 1404 (a), the Cali-
fornia statute of limitations would be applicable. It has been urged,
however, that results like this one are open to question where the trans-
feror court has no connection with the controversy beyond the fact that
plaintiff chose to sue and defendant could be served with process there,
and where the transferee court has substantial contacts with the case and
therefore a much more legitimate interest in applying the law which im-
plements its own policies. See C. WRi=, FzDERAx CouTs § 44 (1963);
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Important considerations in deciding whether to transfer a
case include
the relative ease of access to sources of proof ... and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses ... and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive .... The court will weigh relative advantages
and obstacles to fair trial.... But unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.117
Thus, because this presumption favors the plaintiff's choice of
forum, he is frequently able to resist transfer from a favorable
court. Plaintiff would want to argue in the alternative, however,
that if the case is transferred, the law of the transferor court
should be applied in the new forum.1 s
2. Applying the Procedural Standards of the Forum
The uncertainty as to the law governing appeals of arbitra-
tion awards creates an equal degree of uncertainty as to the ap-
plicable procedural requirements for making an appeal. If the
Federal Arbitration Act is found to be applicable, section 301 ac-
tions to vacate or modify an arbitration award may be pre-
cluded. This result would eliminate the possibility of forum shop-
ping, since the appeal would have to be commenced within three
months in "the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made .... 119 The best approach for
the litigant interested in forum shopping may be to argue that
while the federal act's specific standards regarding vacation,
modification, and correction of the award should be adopted into
federal substantive law by analogy, the Act is not specifically ap-
plicable.
Procedural standards of the forum state may be consulted
if the Federal Arbitration Act is not deemed to be controlling.
For example, in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. the Court held
that the timeliness of an action within the ambit of section 301 (a)
Currie, supra note 112, at 463: Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict
of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 341, 350 (1960).
117. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (emphasis
added).
118. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
119. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-12 (1970). 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970) contains simi-
lar language. However, in UAW v. White Motor Corp., 85 L.R.R.M.
2548 (D. Minn. 1973), the court held that an action to enforce an arbitra-
tor's award may be brought either under the Federal Arbitration Act
or section 301. This decision implies that alternative sets of procedural
standards are available, thereby making forum shopping possible even
where the Federal Arbitration Act is found to be specifically applicable.
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must be determined, as a matter of federal law, by reference to
the appropriate state statute of limitations.120 In so holding, the
Court refused to devise a uniform time limitation as part of its
body of federal substantive law under section 301. The Court
reasoned that the need for uniformity is greatest where its ab-
sence would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual
processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote-
the formation of the collective agreement and the private settle-
ment of disputes under it. For the most part, statutes of limita-
tion come into play only when these processes have already bro-
ken down, and lack of uniformity in this area is therefore un-
likely to frustrate labor policy in any important way. Thus, al-
though stating that a uniform limitations provision for sec-
tion 301 (a) suits might well constitute a desirable statutory ad-
dition, the Court concluded that there is no justification for the
drastic sort of judicial legislation that was urged upon it. 121 Un-
der the Hoosier Cardinal doctrine, then, where (1) there is no
applicable federal statute of limitations, and (2) a state statute
of limitations is found to be applicable, the state statute of limita-
tions becomes a part of the federal substantive law to be applied
in that state. The difficulty, as far as the appealability of arbi-
tration awards is concerned, lies in the determination of whether
or not a state statute of limitations is applicable.
After Hoosier Cardinal, the applicable statutes of limita-
tion are those of the forum state, notwithstanding any -provision
120. 383 U.S. 696 (1966). While Hoosier Cardinal involved an agree-
ment to provide accumulated vacation pay to qualified employees upon
termination of their employment without any arbitration clause applica-
ble to the dispute, the holding clearly encompasses all section 301 (a) ac-
tions-including actions brought to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitra-
tion award allegedly made pursuant to an arbitration clause in the col-
lective bargaining agreement.
121. Id. at 702. Presumably, this same rationale could be applied to
other state procedural provisions. Justice White, joined in his dissent
to Hoosier Cardinal by Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, disputed
the majority's claim that fashioning a uniform federal limitations period
would be too bold an exercise of judicial innovation, noting that "here
there is no dispute concerning whether a statute of limitations is to be
fashioned-the choice is between one statute or 50." Id. at 713. Indeed,
the Court's approach adopts hundreds of limitations statutes where many
states have different limitations provisions for different types of section
301 suits. See id. at 798 n.1.
The dissent says that state law should be applied in section 301 situa-
tions only to the extent that it supplements and fulfills federal policy;
the ultimate question is what federal policy requires. Justice White
made a strong argument that federal policy requires the Court to estab-
lish, under its authority to develop the substantive law of labor contracts,
a single uniform limitations period.
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in the collective agreement that the agreement shall be governed
by the laws of a different state.12 2 However, it would seem that
the common-law presumption against applying state arbitration
statutes to collective bargaining agreements would preclude an
application of the appeal deadlines contained in these acts. Nev-
ertheless in Hill v. Aro Corp.,123 with no evidence in the record
that the parties had intended any arbitration statute to be appli-
cable, the court in providing that a motion to vacate the award
must be served on the adverse party within three months, found
both the state and federal acts consistent with the policy of the
national labor law. The court concluded that the failure of peti-
tioner to act within the three-month time limitation of these acts
constituted a bar to his action. 2 4
If the time limitations of the arbitration statutes are not
found to be applicable, the aggrieved party may seek judicial
impeachment of the arbitration award -by a suit in equity or by
an action at law. A suit to enforce an equitable claim may be
barred by laches.125  Equity courts may also adopt the time
fixed by the statutes of limitation for barring claims at law in
analogous cases as the period after which they will preclude a
recovery in equity. 2 6 This variation of the defense of laches is
122. State law was also used in Howerton v. J. Christenson Co., 76
L.R.R.M. 2937 (N.D. Cal. 1971), where a federal district court, relying
on Hoosier Cardinal, applied a state statute requiring petitions to vacate
an arbitration award to be filed within 100 days after its issuance.
123. 275 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ohio, 1967).
124. Id. at 487. Accord, Howerton v. J. Christenson Co., 76 L.R.R.M.
2937 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (100 day requirement for petitioning to vacate or
correct an award). Support for the adoption of a short limitations period
can be found in Hoosier Cardinal. There the Court stated that the six-
month provision governing unfair labor practice proceedings (29 U.S.C.§ 160(b) (1970)) suggests that relatively rapid disposition of labor dis-
putes is a goal of federal labor law. 383 U.S. at 707. Furthermore,
there is in general considerable judicial reluctance to leave an area un-
controlled by any limitations period whatever. See Hill, State Proce-
dural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. Rnv. 66, 79-
80 (1955).
125. See 27 Am. Ju. 2d Equity §§ 130, 153, 154, 163, 176 (1966). The
elements of the laches defense have been listed as including: (1) con-
duct of the defendant giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made, (2) complainant's delay in asserting his rights after notice of the
defendant's conduct and an opportunity to institute suit, (3) defendant's
lack of knowledge that complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit, and (4) injury to defendant in the event relief is accorded.
See id. § 162. The principle of the doctrine of laches is similar to those
inherent in such terms as "acquiescence," "estoppel," "ratification," and
"waiver." See id. § 152.
126. See id. § 159,
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normally applied only where a considerable period of time has
elapsed. 127
While it is far from certain that the Federal Arbitration
Act will control in situations involving the appeal of a labor ar-
bitration award based on a procedural decision of the arbitrator,
the petitioning party would want to register his appeal of the
award within three months after it is made. Additionally, since
many state and federal courts have required strict compliance
with the procedural requirements of the state or federal arbitra-
tion statutes,128 the petitioner should carefully inspect these pro-
visions and comply if possible. He should also look for possible
violations of these requirements by the arbitrator or by his ad-
versary, for even though the statutes may not be controlling, the
particular procedural provisions, if compatible with the emerg-
ing federal law, may be adopted by the court as part of federal
substantive law.
1 29
In dealing with statutory procedural provisions, courts are
not limited to either accepting or rejecting particular provisions;
a third option exists-the particular provision may be deemed
to be directory. For example, many state statutes specify a time
period after the close of the hearing during which the award
must 'be completed.' 30 In International Association of Machinists
127. See, e.g., Murray v. Hawkins, 144 Ga. 613, 87 S.E. 1068 (1916);
George v. Johnson, 45 N.IL 456 (1864).
128. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. General Elec.
Co., 406 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969), where commencement of an action to
compel arbitration by petition under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act instead of by complaint under section 301 was held to be valid in
that the Arbitration Act had been recognized as applicable to labor cases.
At the district court level, 282 F. Supp. 413 (N.D.N.Y. 1968), the court
held that an action to stay must be filed within the state statutory time
limits. In Fischer v. Guaranteed Concrete Co., 276 Minn. 510, 514, 151
N.W.2d 266, 269 (1967), a request for vacation of an award was denied
under a provision of a Minnesota statute. The argument that the Minne-
sota statute was not applicable was rejected by the court, citing Lincoln
Mills, with this observation: "[T]he controlling substantive law is Fed-
eral law," but "state law, if compatible with the purposes of § 301, may
be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the Fed-
eral policy." A New York court, in 2166 Bronx Park East, Inc. v. Local
32E, Building Service Employees, 45 Misc. 2d 492, 257 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193
(Sup. Ct. 1965) held that a motion to compel arbitration must be served
on the other party in technical compliance with the state statutory re-
quirements.
129. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
130. For example, in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 43, § 213.12
(1964), and Connecticut, Coxw. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-416 (1968), the stat-
utes require that a written decision shall be rendered within 60 days, and
in Washington, WAsn. REv. CoD. ANN. § 7.04.090 (1961), within 30 days
after the close of the hearing. Similarly, the rules of the American Arbi-
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v. Geometric Tool Co., 131 the court of appeals, in dealing with the
60-day provision in the Connecticut act, held that it was not
proper to adopt such a state statute as part of the federal law
in view of the strong need for federal uniformity in this area.
A better rule, said the court, is that any limitation on the time
in which an award may be rendered should be considered direc-
tory, rather than mandatory, thereby giving the court discretion
to uphold a late award.132 The court distinguished the case from
Hoosier Cardinal:
[W]e are not dealing with the time within which a party must
commence a suit in court or be time-barred. Rather, we are
dealing with the time in which an arbitrator can render a valid
award, and private settlement of a dispute is one of the most
desired federal goals and is well within the policy of furthering
consensual processes. Thus, unlike the Hoosier situation, we
have a very strong need for federal uniformity here, and an in-
corporation of this Connecticut statute into labor-management
resolution in that state derogates from that need.133
The court concluded that it should always be within a court's
power to uphold a late award if no objection to the delay has
been made prior to its rendition or if there is no showing that ac-
tual harm to the losing party was caused by the delay. Thus,
any appeal seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award because of its
lateness should either (1) be preceded by an objection, before the
award is rendered, that the award is untimely, or (2) be ac-
companied by a showing that the appellant has been caused ac-
tual harm by the delay. Where either of these conditions are sat-
isfied, the case for adopting into federal substantive law a time
limit for the rendition of an award would be considerably
stronger than it was in Geometric Tool.
To the extent that the procedural standards of state courts
are adopted into federal substantive law, the predictable effect is
tration Association establish a time limit of 30 days following the close
of the hearing, unless the parties agree to the contrary, A ERIcAN ARBI-
TRAriON AssocrATIoN, VOLuNTARY LABOR ARBiTRATIoN RuLEs § 37 (1968).
About one-half of the state statutes give specific power to the parties
by agreement to limit the time within which the award must be ren-
dered. See FsAmwET R , supra note 49, at 334; Kagel, Labor and Com-
mercial Arbitration Under the California Arbitration Statute, 38 CAL. L.
REV. 799, 823 (1950); Comment, State Arbitration Statutes Applicable to
Labor Disputes, 19 Mo. L. Rsv. 280, 292 (1954). At common law, an
award rendered after the expiration of a time limit specified in the col-
lective bargaining agreement is considered void. Annot., 154 A.L.R. 1392
(1945). There are, however, a substantial number of decisions taking
the contrary view. See FARwF.ATmm, supra note 49, at 366.
131. 70 L.R.R.M. 2228 (2d Cir. 1968).
132. Id. at 2229.
133. Id.
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to impose upon the arbitrator and both parties the most strin-
gent procedural requirements of all districts in which jurisdic-
tion and venue can be maintained. This will necessarily result
since the party seeking review has the sole option to shop for a
forum,13 4 and, where economically feasible, will most certainly
seek to bring his action in the forum with the strictest standards
in order to facilitate vacation, modification, or correction of the
award.
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. SuBsTANIVE CoNsiDERATIoNs: EVALUATING THE DEcISIoN
OF THE ARBITRATOR
In maintaining that an arbitrator's award must be vacated,
modified, or corrected, the petitioning party may wish to argue
that the decision is contrary to the well established custom, or
past practice, of the parties. Additionally, the results of prior
arbitrations involving similar disputes, while not binding, may
properly be cited as examples of just awards. Finally, since the
nature of the relationship between the parties is largely a mat-
ter of contract, the agreements between the parties must be ana-
lyzed for explicit or implicit limitations on the jurisdictional
and procedural powers of the arbitrator.
1. The Past Practice Standard
In evaluating a petitioner's appeal, one factor the reviewing
body must consider is the past practices of the parties. If arbi-
tration proceedings have always (been held at a -particular loca-
tion within a certain number of days after the filing of a griev-
ance, a petitioner objecting to the time and -place of a hearing
will have a considerably weaker case than if the proceedings have
134. See Holmsten Refrigeration Inc. v. Refrigerated Storage Cen-
ter, Inc., 357 Mass. 580, 260 N.E.2d 216 (1970) (until the three month pe-
riod for urging vacation, modification, or correction has expired, the court
is without power to confirm the arbitration award). The right to forum
shop will have real meaning only for those who are able to obtain juris-
diction and venue in more than one state (e.g., employees of an employer
doing business in more than one state). The advantages of forum shop-
ping are also limited by the fact that many courts hold that procedural
defects have been waived where such defects are not objected to before
the award is received. National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d
377, 171 N.E.2d 302, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960). But see Hellman v. Wol-
brom, 31 App. Div. 2d 477, 298 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1969); Consolidated Carting
Corp. v. Teamsters Local 282, 28 App. Div. 2d 667, 280 N.Y.S.2d 872
(1967).
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traditionally been held at a site and time acceptable to all par-
ties or selected -by the arbitrator.
The arbitrators under a collective agreement are
indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining
process. They sit to settle disputes . . . that require for their
solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular
factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular
agreements. 8 5
Furthermore, the Court in Wa'rior & Gulf recognized that
"[g] aps may be left [in a collective bargaining agreement] to be
filled in by reference to the practices of the particular industry
and of the various shops covered by the agreement."'1 6 Arbi-
trators are thus not confined to the express provisions of the
contract, but may look to "the industrial common law" since it is,
by implication, incorporated into the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 37
In examining this past practice standard, it should be noted
that not every practice is binding. The argument that past prac-
tice requires a particular result is frequently made by at least
one of the parties involved in an arbitration proceeding, but to
give the argument effect, the proponent must provide "full, com-
plete and clear proof" of the existence of a well established cus-
tom. 3 8 Sylvester Garrett, in one of the most widely quoted de-
cisions on this subject, stated:
A custom or practice is not something which arises simply be-
cause a given course of conduct has been pursued by manage-
ment or the employees on one or more occasions. A custom or
a practice is a usage evolved by men as a normal reaction to
a recurring type situation. It must be shown to be the accepted
course of conduct characteristically repeated in response to the
given set of underlying circumstances. This is not to say that
the course of conduct must be accepted in the sense of both par-
ties having agreed to it, but rather that it must be accepted in
the sense of being regarded by the men involved as the normal
and proper response to the underlying circumstances pre-
sented.'3 9
Thus, the arbitrator must determine whether the alleged prac-
tice is merely one of the courses of action followed from time
to time by the parties, or whether it is the exclusive response
of the parties. In so doing, he must consider many factors of
135. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596.
136. 363 U.S. at 580.
137. Id. at 581-82.
138. Sioux City Battery Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 243 (1953) (Updegraff, Ar-
bitrator).
139. U.S. Steel, National Tube Div., 2 STEEwoRmRs ARB. BurL. 1187(1953).
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varying importance, including the express terms of the written
contract, the prior negotiations of the parties, the degree of its
mutual "acceptance," the duration over which it has been fol-
lowed, and any unique facts in the tradition of that particular
industry.140
The effect of the past practices may be modified by agree-
ment of the parties. In order to eliminate it, however, the con-
tract language must be clear, strong, and unequivocal. Clauses
providing that the written agreement is the "entire understand-
ing" of the parties and that nothing outside the agreement is
binding will not dissolve the past practice standard.141 Con-
versely, the union may seek to include certain clauses preserving
unwritten practices which employees have come to consider as
part of their employment contract.
14 2
The past practice standard provides one of the most trouble-
some problems in reviewing an arbitrator's award. While the
courts recognize that the express terms of a contractual agree-
ment may be altered through the practice of the parties, 143 the
complexities of judicial review are compounded to the extent
an arbitrator relies on such practices in making the award. There
are two landmark cases concerning this problem, H. K. Porter
Co. v. United Steel Products Workers'4 4 and Torrington Co. v.
Metal Products Workers Local 1645.14 5 In Porter, the arbitrator,
who based his decision on the practice of the union and a com-
pany acquired -by Porter, had his award vacated in part because
the court found that part of the award did not draw its essence
from the collective agreement or the practice of the parties.146
In Torrington, the arbitrator held that past practice placed the
burden on the company to negotiate away the practice if it de-
sired to discontinue it. Having failed to do so, said the arbitrator,
the company was obliged to continue the practice. The court
refused to enforce the award on the grounds that the matter had
been brought up in negotiations but not incorporated into the
140. McLaughlin, Custom and Practice in Labor Arbitration, 18 ARB.
J. 205, 207 (1963). Lester Block concluded that three essential ingredi-
ents must be found: (1) the practice must be unequivocal, (2) it must
have existed over a reasonably long period of time, and (3) it must have
been mutually accepted by the parties. Block, Customs and Usages as
Factors in Arbitration Decisions, 15 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 311, 313 (1962).
141. McLaughlin, supra note 140, at 218-19.
142. Id. at 219.
143. See In re Borrazas, 50 L.R.R.M. 2891 (1962).
144. 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964).
145. 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966),140, 333 F,2 l at 60 ,
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contract. Therefore, as a matter of law, it was neither a part
of the contract nor a proper matter for the arbitrator to rely
upon.14
7
It may be argued that both Porter and Torrington fully re-
viewed the merits of an award, contrary to the Supreme Court di-
rective in Enterprise Wheel' 48 to avoid such review. However,
in Porter the sole requirement imposed by the reviewing court
was that the practice to which the arbitrator referred be his-
torically factual. One commentator has urged that review in
this narrow context is desirable, even though allowing it results
in the anomaly that, while the arbitrator is the supreme fact
finder in most situations, his findings of historical fact are sub-
ject to review when they are the basis for implying a contractual
condition. This difference, it is argued, is justified by the fact
that the latter is a more inclusive finding, relating not only to a
particular factual situation but also to the complete agreement
between the parties.149
When the arbitrator is admittedly relying not on the written
words of the contract, but on the practice of the parties to infer
an agreement or to modify the clear words of the contract, there
is no need to place a burden on the opponent of the award to show
that the printed contract does not support the award. In these
cases, the burden should be on the proponent to show that the
practice was indeed relied on by the parties in defining their re-
lationship. The burden should then shift to the opponent to
prove that the facts relied on do not exist.1 50 Another problem
arises concerning who-court or arbitrator-should ultimately
interpret the significance of the practice of the parties, and, more
specifically, what practices are to be incorporated into the con-
tractual obligations of the parties. Because this requires a thor-
ough understanding of collective bargaining relationships, the
arbitrator's findings should be final because of his expertise
concerning the common law of the shop. He is better not only
at determining what actually occurred, but also in interpreting
facts in light of the relationship between the parties. Thus, the
inference drawn by the arbitrator from the practices of the par-
ties would not ordinarily be open to the opponent to attack or
the court to overrule.' 5'
147. 362 F.2d at 682.
148. 363 U.S. at 596.
149. Griffin, Judicial Review of Lab'or Arbitration Awards, 4 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REv. 39, 59-60 (1969).
150. Id. at 68.
151. Id. at 60, 68.
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The result in Torrington places far greater restrictions on
the powers of the arbitrator to consider the past practices of the
parties. Because the historical facts were apparently uncon-
tested in that case, the court itself decided what in the practice
of the parties was to be considered as part of the agreement.
This broad review usurps the function of the arbitrator and, like
a full review on the merits, is at odds with the Supreme Court
holding in Enterprise Wheel. 1 52  The more desirable approach
would be to incorporate the Porter requirement that the past
practice relied on by the arbitrator be historically factual as a
limited exception to the traditional deference given arbitrators'
decisions on the merits. Such an appproach properly recognizes
that once the facts are established, the inferences to be derived
therefrom are those determined by the arbitrator.
2. Precedent
Closely related to reliance on past practice in the making of
arbitration awards is the use of precedent: rather than looking
at what the parties have done in the past, the arbitrators look at
what interpretation previous arbitrators have given to the ac-
tions of other parties. The law regarding the application of
precedent to arbitration proceedings is clear. Arbitrators are not
bound by law to follow precedent in the sense of stare decisis;
they are left free to decide each case on its own unique facts.
Thus the fact that a past arbitrator, faced with a similar situ-
ation, decided that his proceeding should be held at a particular
time or place which made it impossible for a key witness to at-
tend, will not bind a later arbitrator. Nevertheless, the petition-
ing party would want to cite any favorable decision as evidence
both of the prevailing practice in the industry and of a proce-
durally fair and uncontested decision. Later use of the favor-
able precedent in arguing that a contrary decision is unfair, how-
ever, would probably be regarded as an attempt to extend the
use of precedent beyond its limited applicability in rendering an
arbitration award.153
152. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
153. While precedent in arbitration cases is never stare decisis, it
may be res judicata. When the same parties are involved, arbitrators
are willing to follow prior awards even though they would not have ren-
dered the same award if they had heard the prior case. In such cases
it is often held that adherence to precedent is desirable in order to main-
tain stable labor-management relations. Brewers Board of Trade, Inc.,
38 Lab. Arb. 679 (1962) (Turkus, Arbitrator); Cities Service Oil Co.,
AAA Case No. 13-13 (1959) (Wirtz, Arbitrator); FAIWEATHEn, supra note
49, at 339.
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There are strong arguments against any extension of the ap-
plicability of precedent in arbitration proceedings. Such an ex-
tension would diminish the flexibility of the arbitration process,
where, since arbitrators are commonly hired for their special
knowledge of an industry and the special needs of the particular
parties involved, flexibility is particularly desirable. Further-
more, fairness would be subordinated to uniformity, labor-man-
agement difficulties would be fostered, the role of the arbitrator
would be substantially reduced, and inapt awards would be re-
peated rather than ignored. Clearly, arbitration would rapidly
lose its claim as a swift, inexpensive, and impartial means of set-
tling labor disputes.154 Under the present system, while prec-
edent is not controlling, it is one of the guides which both the
parties to the dispute and the arbitrator may consult for aid in
arguing and deciding disputes.
3. Agreements Between the Parties
In view of the conflicting theories as to the applicability of
the Federal Arbitration Act, state arbitration acts, and the com-
mon law, it is essential that the parties decide in advance what
types of disputes they wish to submit to arbitration and under
what body of law the arbitrators must act. The parties, if
they wish to be bound by the federal act or a state arbitration
act should so state in explicit terms in the collective bargain-
ing agreement (or, if applicable, in the employment contracts). A
general provision to the effect that the agreement has been made
under and shall be governed by the laws of a particular state is
subject to challenge.155
In addition to the arbitration statutes, the parties may incor-
porate other statutes into the agreement which the arbitrator
will interpret. The parties should also consider adopting the
rules of procedure set forth by organizations such as the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association.1 56 The parties should explicitly de-
154. McMillan, Role of Precedent in Labor Arbitration 6 (typewrit-
ten manuscript in Univ. of Minn. Law Library).
155. LaVale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569 (1974).
156. The Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Asso-
ciation provide for representation by counsel, AMmiCAN ARBITRATION As-
socroATio, VOLu-T-TAnY LABOR ARBIrATON RuuES § 20 (1968), fixing the
time and place of hearing, id. § 19, requesting a stenographic record, id.
§ 21, attendance at hearings by persons having a direct interest, id. § 22,
serving notice, id. § 36, order of proceedings, id. § 26, use of affidavits,
id. § 29, reopening hearings, id. § 32, written awards, id. § 37, and estab-
lishing time limits, id., e.g., § 37. One possible disadvantage, however,
is the fact that wbere parties agree to 4rbitr~te under these rules they
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termine the extent to which the arbitrator shall be free to ig-
nore established standards, both as to procedure and substance,
and incorporate this into their agreement. Finally, they may
mutually agree to resubmit an issue to an arbitrator and thereby
(1) obviate the need to petition the court and (2) expand the
arbitrator's powers of review.
B. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS: UNFAIRNESS AND THE CASE FOR
A LImiTED EXTENSION OF JuDIcIAL REVIEw
While the parties to a collective bargaining agreement often
agree to submit certain disputes to final and ,binding arbitration,
such agreements are limited by interpreting them to incorporate
an intent by the parties to have a full and fair proceeding, even
where procedural limitations on the arbitrator are absent. In de-
ciding whether this procedural fairness is present, the policy
behind the traditional deference given by the courts to arbitra-
tors-respect for their special knowledge of the common law of
the shop-may not be applicable. In matters of procedural fair-
ness, where the courts have the special knowledge, an expan-
sion of the review function may be appropriate.
1. The Right to a Fair Hearing
A reasonable construction of any collective bargaining agree-
ment is that the parties intend the arbitrators of their grievances
to adjudicate within some procedural rubric. Although it was
agreed that the arbitration decisions were to be final and binding
upon the parties, implicit in such an agreement was the concept
of decisions reached by a fair means.15
Since judicial control and review prior to arbitration is very
limited, the post-award review procedures are of great import-
ance. 158 In determining whether there has been basic procedural
fairness in an arbitration proceeding under section 301, the courts
have recognized that the Federal Arbitration Act is "a part of
the body of the federal labor law to which courts may look in
may be authorizing the American Arbitration Association to administer
the arbitration, since a provision in the Rules so states: "When parties
agree to arbitrate under these Rules and an arbitration is instituted
thereunder, they thereby authorize the AAA to administer the arbitra-
tion .... " Id. § 3.
157. Central Packing Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 195 F.
Supp. 188, 192 (D. Kan. 1961). Accord, Weyerhauser Co. v. International
Bhd. of Pulp Workers, 190 F. Supp. 196 (D. Me. 1960); Ingraham Co. v.
Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 171 F. Supp. 103 (D. Conn. 1959).
158. Note, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration, 53 GEo.
L,J, 1079 (1965).
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defining federal law under [section 301] . .. "159 Furthermore,
where not inconsistent with federal law, the state arbitration acts
may also be consulted in defining a fair arbitration proceeding.
Although subject to somewhat less weight, the standard pro-
cedures promulgated by organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association may be used, as may specific procedures
prevalent in the industry or other comparable industries. Fi-
nally, a labor arbitration decision, in contrast to commercial arbi-
tration, is normally accompanied by a written opinion of the arbi-
trator. Use of the opinion as a basis for an appeal, however,
is of very limited value since the expressed policy of the courts
is that there will be no review on the merits.16 0 Nevertheless,
the opinion may be cited as evidence of one of the grounds neces-
sary for vacation, modification, or correction of the award. The
above approach assumes, of course, that no specific set of stand-
ards is found to be controlling, thus requiring evaluation and
possible incorporation of certain established standards into the
body of federal substantive law.
The basic right to a fair proceeding springs from the due
process guarantee of the United States Constitution, although
this right has been a part of the common-law tradition for cen-
turies. However, due process is not a single, static concept.
There is due process in criminal proceedings, in civil litigation,
and in administrative hearings. What passes for procedural reg-
ularity in one forum does not necessarily so pass in another. In
the arbitration context, the phrase "due process" does not evoke
the strict legal sense in which the term is often defined, but
rather a type of informal proceeding which nevertheless pro-
vides the framework for a fair and equitable result.' 6 ' The very
nature of arbitration tends to limit the extent to which its pro-
ceedings and its concluding award should be subject to review
by the courts. It is conducted informally by persons not nec-
essarily trained in the law. The evidence heard need meet none
159. Ingraham v. Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 171 F.
Supp. 103 (D. Conn. 1959), citing the pre-Lincoln Mills case of Signal-
Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
160. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their rea-
sons for an award. To require opinions free of ambiguity may
lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no &upporting opin-
ions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion
tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and
aids in clarifying the underlying agreement.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960).
161. See Stone, Due Process in Labor Arbitration, 24 N.Y.U. CoNF.
LAB. 11, 12 (1971).
[Vol. 59:109
1974] PROCEDURAL DECISIONS OF ARBITRATORS 147
of the technical evidentiary requirements imposed by courts of
law.10 2 Contrary to administrative actions, where questions of
due process are raised with considerable frequency, appeal of an
arbitration award is seldom based on procedural unfairness. One
commentator attributes this to the fact that it is not the state
that is deciding the issue, but rather individuals selected by the
parties themselves pursuant to a mutual agreement. 0 3
There are several areas in which a reviewing court will scru-
tinize the decision of the arbitrator. The court's considerable
deference to the decisions of arbitrators operating in their own
domain will not prevent the court from intervening to correct
manifest error or injustice. 04 It is said that judicial scrutiny
makes for better judgments,16 5 although it has also been sug-
gested that a greater deterrent to indifferent arbitration awards
is the factor of acceptability-arbitrators wishing to be called
upon again are desirous of having their actions approved 'by both
parties.1 6
162. Compania Panemena Maritima v. J.E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1957). In an action to enjoin arbitrators from proceed-
ing further it was held that there could be no application to the district
court to review rulings of arbitrators on admissibility of evidence regard-
ing fraud while the arbitration was in process. The party must wait and
attack the award when made. Accord, Commercial Solvents Corp. v.
Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Respond-
ent sought to make use of the federal discovery rules by serving notice
on the other party as to the taking of depositions. He was denied this
privilege, for "respondent chose to avail itself of procedures peculiar to
the arbitral process rather than those used in judicial determinations."
20 F.R.D. at 361. The opinion outlines with clarity the differences be-
tween arbitral and court procedures.
163. Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 519, 521-22 (1960).
164. See Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577(2d Cir. 1967), where the United States Supreme Court held that an arbi-
tration award based on manifest disregard of the law would not be en-
forced; to set aside an award of arbitration, the error must be palpable
and must be more than what is required to set aside a jury verdict. John
W. Daniel & Co. v. Janaf, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 219 (D. Va. 1958), adfd, 262
F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1959). See aiso Electronics Corp. v. Local 272, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers, 492 F.2d 1255, 1257 (lst Cir. 1974), where the
court held that there was a gross mistake: "Where the 'fact' underly-
ing an arbitrator's decision is concededly a non-fact and where the par-
ties cannot fairly be charged with the misapprehension, the award can-
not stand."
165. However, the discovery of a technical error will not constitute
an adequate basis for vacating an award. See Stereotyper's Local 18 v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
954 (1968).
166. See SnIvnN, ACCEPTABUIZTY AS A FACTOR IN ARBITRATIoN 11-12
(1952).
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Arbitration awards may also be set aside where the regula-
tion of the proceedings by the arbitrator is so unfair that it de-
nies one party a fair hearing. In Harvey Aluminum v. United
Steelworkers,167 the arbitrator did not consider testimony of a
witness because the testimony was untimely under a rule of evi-
dence not normally binding in arbitration proceedings. Refusal
to hear pertinent and material evidence when no warning was
given as to the evidentiary rules to be followed was deemed to
be a denial of a fair hearing and the arbitration award was va-
cated. Similarly, no finality is due an award rendered by a
corrupt, bribed, or biased arbitrator. None is due an award oth-
erwise infected by fraud or venality. Commitment of a decision
to final and binding arbitration presupposes an honest presenta-
tion to an honest trier. Nothing less will do.168
The question is more difficult when the issue changes from
blatant dishonesty to a claim by the losing party that there has
not been a full and fair hearing for reasons such as inadequate
notice, insufficient time to prepare, or exclusion of evidence.
Notice, scheduling, postponements, and evidentiary rulings are
the procedural incidents of any proceeding and are within the
natural control of the trier. An arbitrator chosen to make a "fi-
nal and binding" decision on the merits is also arguably chosen
to make "final and binding" procedural decisions. It is equally
arguable, however, that the parties have agreed to a decision on
the merits which is "final and binding" only if it is preceded by
a hearing which is full and fair. 69 This issue is often reduced to a
question of the extent to which parties may contract away due
process.
The main argument favoring judicial laissez faire with re-
spect to arbitration has been that it is a voluntary form of dis-
pute settlement based upon a contract,17 0 having even greater
force when the parties agree to arbitrate after the dispute has
arisen. This argument assumes that a person may waive statu-
tory and constitutional rights by contract. Even if that were
true, however, the argument that one may contract away rights
by agreeing to arbitrate may be a contradiction in terms. An ar-
167. 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
168. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas Co., 393 U.S.
145 (1968) (the elementary standards of impartiality normally associated
with judicial proceedings are not suspended when the parties agree to
resolve a dispute through arbitration).
169. Dunau, supra note 41, at 186-87.
170. Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63
HAv. L. REv. 681, 682 (1950).
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bitration agreement, while having the formal aspects of a con-
tract, assumes by its very nature the absence of any agreement
between the parties-except that they agree to a particular
method of settling the dispute. Thus an arbitration agreement
looks not to the creation of such social relationships as nor-
mally fall within the sphere of contract, but rather to repairing
the breakdown of those relationships after they have been estab-
lished by contract.17 ' The extent to which the parties have sur-
rendered the safeguards incident to arms-length negotiation of
contracts for a final determination by an arbitrator must also be
considered. 172 To ensure that the decision of the arbitrator will
be enlightened rather than arbitrary, the procedures of the arbi-
tration process must be such that a fair hearing will be held. 73
In attempting to define the limits of judicial inquiry into pro-
cedural unfairness, the scope of the problem is reduced by recog-
nizing that procedural error which has not prejudiced the out-
come need not be addressed by the courts. The size of the prob-
lem is further reduced ,by recognizing that arbitrators must have
wide procedural latitude, consistent with express federal policy
to this effect.17 4 But while the problem can be reduced, it can-
not be eliminated. Suppose that the testimony of a pivotal wit-
ness has been erroneously excluded. Section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act requires that the arbitrator engage in "misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"' 75
before judicial review is appropriate. As a matter of construc-
tion it is unclear whether "misbehavior" or "misconduct" entails
a showing of moral culpability or merely means the commission
of a serious prejudicial error. It has been urged that no show-
ing that the error flowed from independent moral culpability
should be required, for if the standard is one of a full and fair
hearing and a serious prejudicial error infects the proceeding, the
standard for finality has not been met regardless of whether the
171. Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW & CONTEM.
PROB. 631, 632 (1952).
172. One student commentator state that where the parties agree to
settle a particular dispute by arbitration, they are declaring that the ben-
efits of arbitration, whether favorable or unfavorable, are such that they
are irrevocably consenting to the results of a system which is unpredicta-
ble and which may incorrectly interpret their legal rights. Note, Com-
mercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial Role, 52 Mnm. L. REV. 1218,
1232-33 (1968).
173. Carlston, supra note 171, at 632.
174. See Dunau, supra note 41, at 187.
175. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1970); Section 12(a) (2) of the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act contains a similar provision, i.e., '"misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party."
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error results from an honest mistake or from some ethical fail-
ure.176 This approach recognizes that insistence upon procedural
regularity is essential to the interest of securing a "final and
binding" decision on the merits of the controversy. In agreeing
to be bound by an award, the parties, although agreeing to an
informal, nonjudicial proceeding, nevertheless consent with the
expectation that the proceeding will give them a full and fair
opportunity to be heard. Where this does not occur, judicial
intervention is necessary. There is nothing to be gained by pro-
tecting a faulty award; so long as a court recognizes the arbi-
trator's broad discretion and vacates his award only where the
error has been prejudicial, the interest in finality is not likely to
be damaged.
A special question of -procedural fairness arises in the set-
tlement of claims of individual employees where both the union
and the employer have interests other than those of the individ-
ual employee.177 Courts have declined to confirm awards where
both union and management sided against the individual em-
ployee and his rights were not otherwise adequately represented.
This approach recognizes the inherent unfairness in a pro-
ceeding where an individual party at interest does not receive
adequate representation.' 8 Additionally, the National Labor
Relations Board will not defer to the decision of the arbitrator
in such cases. 79 Thus, if grounds for alleging an unfair labor
practice can be found, a victim of such a proceeding can appeal
to the Board to intervene in his behalf.180
2. Judicial Review of the Fairness Question
Arbitrators are recognized, at one and the same time, as
both experts and mere neophytes.' 8' They are considered ex-
perts on the custom and practices of a particular industry,8 2 and
in matters involving interpretation and integration of the "com-
mon law of the shop," their authority is recognized:
176. See Dunau, supra note 41, at 187-88.
177. See Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure
in Labor Arbitration, 13 STm . L. REV. 235 (1961); Summers, Individua
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362
(1962).
178. See Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1968), noted in 55 VA. L. Rsv. 368 (1969).
179. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
180. Id.
181. Jalet, supra note 163, at 557.
182. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960).
[Vol. 59:109
1974] PROCEDURAL DECISIONS OF ARBITRATORS 151
It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and
so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his.'8 3
Thus, if the arbitrator has been empowered to construe the terms
of the contract and his award constitutes a construction that is a
reasonable one, it should be sustained although the court may
disagree, even violently, with that construction. 84 The arbitra-
tor must be considered the expert in this matter. However, it is
submitted that where questions of basic procedural fairness
are involved, the courts, and not the arbitrator, must be consid-
ered the experts. While contrary arguments have been ad-
vanced to the effect that a just result can be achieved by the ar-
bitrator without the observance of legal intricacies-and hope-
fully this will be the case in the vast majority of decisions-the
reasoning of the Steelworkers Trilogy, by analogy, suggests that
in matters dealing with procedural due process the scope of ju-
dicial review should be expanded.
In the Steelworkers Trilogy the Court recognized the special
knowledge of the arbitrators in dealing with matters common
to a -particular industry. Clearly their specialized knowledge
should be given effect through a grant of broad discretionary
powers to deal with their area of expertise. Conversely, in mat-
ters of procedure, the judiciary is better suited to determine what
constitutes a fair hearing within broad due process guidelines.
By asserting a more active role in reviewing arbitration awards
which may have depended upon certain procedural decisions of
the arbitrator, courts will not only do much to remedy partic-
ular procedural infirmities, but will also expand the body of sub-
stantive arbitration law in the area in which it most needs ex-
pansion. It should be noted, however, that any attempt to ex-
pand the role of judicial review in this area is limited by the
fact that only a very small fraction of the awards made by ar-
bitrators are ever contested in the courts.'8 5 Thus, in the vast
majority of cases the parties abide by their promises and are
satisfied with the arbitration process. But when it is other-
183. Id. at 599.
184. Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln
Mills Case, 42 MrniN. L. REV. 333, 354 (1958).
185. "[I]t is impressive how fully these adjudications are ob-
served. A study some few years ago revealed that out of thou-
sands of arbitration awards only 3/10 of one per cent are not
voluntarily complied with and require the aid of court enforce-
ment.
Matthews, Critical Issues in Arbitration Practice: Seniority and Dis-
Charge Cases, 32 RocKx MT. L. Rzv. 37 (1959).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
wise and the participants are before the court, there is cause
for concern and, as one article urges, judges should scan what
has transpired with a practiced eye. For them to do so is not
undesirable, it notes, since the advantages of arbitration may
already have been lost.8 6 On the other hand, closer judicial
scrutiny of appealed awards would probably result in a greater
number of appeals.
If the courts expand their role in reviewing arbitration hear-
ings, they should keep the informal nature of the proceeding in
mind. If they do so, they will refrain from exacting adherence
to all of the legal intricacies involved in a courtroom proceeding.
They also should make a distinction in regard to the types of
procedural violations involved, keeping in mind the judicial
policy of deciding controversies on the merits, rather than on
procedural technicalities, so long as basic fairness is preserved.
Thus, where the alleged grounds for vacating or modifying the
award would, if sustained, prevent a decision on the merits (e.g.
where a motion is filed one day late), the courts should be hes-
itant to overturn the decision of the arbitrator. On the other
hand, where the reversal of an arbitrator's decision would facil-
itate a decision on the merits (e.g., where pivotal testimony has
been excluded), the courts should be more willing to intervene.
As one commentator has noted,
an allegation that an award is unenforceable because of want
of due process in the hearing and determination of the case ob-
viously is a legal question that courts will determine independ-
ently. This is the orthodox arbitration law, and we are confi-
dent it will become part of the federal substantive law.1 87
There remains today considerable room for additional judicial
contributions to the substantive standards which presently guide
the conduct and review of arbitration proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
In selecting a forum to which an arbitrator's award will be
appealed, the first consideration must be whether the dispute
can be resubmitted to the arbitrator. The fact that the arbitra-
tor may have made a manifestly unfair procedural decision is
normally not ground for obtaining a rehearing order. In that
case, the appeal should then be made to either state or federal
court. However, since an action may be removed to federal court,
it would seem that there would be no real advantage in forum
186. Smith & Jones, supra note 38, at 807.
187. Jalet, supra note 163, at 556.
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shopping for a favorable set of state, rather than federal, proce-
dures. There may, however, be a distinct advantage in bringing
an action in the federal or state court of a particular state, since
certain procedural rules of the state become a part of the federal
substantive law in the jurisdiction. Finally, where the conduct
allegedly constituting a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement is also an unfair labor practice, and the arbitration
proceeding can be shown to have been basically unfair or ir-
regular, the National Labor Relations Board may be petitioned to
intervene on behalf of the aggrieved party.
The precise substance of existing arbitration law is unclear.
A specific statement as to the applicability of existing statu-
tory law to labor disputes is needed. While ideally this should
come from Congress, the conflicting pressures on that body are
such that, absent a united proposal by unions and management,
it is unlikely that such a legislative clarification will be forth-
coming. The Supreme Court must therefore rise to the task of
interpreting this area of ambiguity. To invoke in this instance
the standard canon of deferring to the legislature is to acqui-
esce to ambiguity and uncertainty. A decision that the Federal
Arbitration Act is applicable to collective bargaining agreements
would do much to make explicit and specific the common-law
standards evolving from the Lincoln Mills and Enterprise Wheel
decisions.' 8 8
State arbitration acts, the past practices of the parties, and
precedent, while not controlling, should be considered in decid-
ing whether the arbitrator has met the test of basic procedural
fairness. The Supreme Court's preference in the Steelworkers
Trilogy for letting the expert decide favors a judicial determi-
nation of the procedural fairness issue, for it is the judiciary,
and not the arbitrator, that is the expert in such matters. Such
an extension of judicial review would promote basic procedural
fairness in labor arbitration proceedings.
188. However, if the Federal Arbitration Act is found to be specifi-
cally applicable, a jurisdictional problem may arise in some cases now
covered by federal law under section 301, since the Federal Arbitration
Act does not provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction while
section 301 does. Victorias Mill Co. v. Hugo Neu Corp., 196 F. Supp. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). It should also be noted that forum shopping might be
eliminated under such a decision, See note 119 supra and accompanying
text.

